as the candidates being the winners in some (resp. all) of the complete extensions of R. We show that, although the computation of possible and necessary winners may be hard in general case, it is polynomial for the family of positional scoring procedures. We show that the possible and necessary Condorcet winners

In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than

Given an unknown tournament over {1,..., n}, we show that the query complexity of the question “Is there a vertex with outdegree n − 1? ” (known as a Condorcet winner in social choice theory) is exactly 2n − ⌊log(n) ⌋ − 2. This stands in stark contrast to the evasiveness of this property

A Condorcet voting scheme chooses a winning candidate as one who defeats all others in pairwise majority rule. We provide a review which includes the rigorous mathematical treatment for calculating the limiting probability of a Condorcet winner for any number of candidates and value of n odd

We show that approval voting strategic equilibria are closely related to honest Condorcet Winners. There exists an approval equilibrium with a clear font-runner F and runner-up R if and only if the F is the clear Condorcet Winner and R the Condorcet runner-up. In contrast, we show that margins

Condorcet winner

ordering; the outcome chosen is then the alternative that receives the highest number of points. A Condorcet or majority winner is a candidate who obtains more votes than her opponents in any pairwise comparison. Condorcet [4] showed that all positional rules fail to satisfy the majority criterion

We present an algorithm for generating a random weak order of m objects in which all possible weak orders are equally likely. The form of the algorithm suggests analytic expressions for the probability of a Condorcet winner both for linear and for weak preference orders. 1.

ABSTRACT. An alternative is a Condorcet winner if it beats all other alternatives in a pairwise majority vote. A social choice correspondence is a Condorcet extension if it se-lects the Condorcet winners—and nothing else—whenever a Condorcet winner exists. It is well known that Condorcet extensions

This paper examines four single-winner election methods, denoted here as Woodall, Benham, Smith-AV, and Tideman, that all make use of both Condorcet’s pairwise comparison principle and Hare’s elimination and reallocation principle used in the alternative vote. These methods have many significant