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Results 1 - 10
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450
Distributed Spectrum Trading in Multiple-Seller Cognitive Radio Networks
"... Abstract—This paper studies spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks in which multiple service providers (SPs) sell unused spectrum to multiple unlicensed secondary users (SUs). Motivated by the nature of the problem with new considerations, spectrum trading is modeled as a multi-leader multi-fo ..."
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Abstract—This paper studies spectrum trading in cognitive radio networks in which multiple service providers (SPs) sell unused spectrum to multiple unlicensed secondary users (SUs). Motivated by the nature of the problem with new considerations, spectrum trading is modeled as a multi-leader multi
Multiple-Object XOR . . . and Seller Priorities
"... Auctions and exchanges are one of the most important market mechanisms for price determination and allocation of goods. In this paper we consider the case when each buyer has a limited budget and wishes to buy at most one item in multi-item auctions. We show the limitations of two known mechanisms ..."
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fairness to the sellers: if an item received a bid with a higher value than the allocated
Equilibrium in prediction markets with buyers and sellers
- Economics Letters
"... Abstract Prediction markets with buyers and sellers of contracts on multiple outcomes are shown to have unique equilibrium prices, which can be computed in polynomial time. ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Abstract Prediction markets with buyers and sellers of contracts on multiple outcomes are shown to have unique equilibrium prices, which can be computed in polynomial time.
Robust Mechanisms for Risk-Averse Sellers
"... The existing literature on optimal auctions focuses on optimizing the expected revenue of the seller, and is appropriate for risk-neutral sellers. In this paper, we identify good mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. As is standard in the economics literature, we model the risk-aversion of a seller by ..."
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Cited by 10 (1 self)
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constant factor approximation when the number of bidders is even a small multiple of the number of items. Along the way we point out that Myerson’s characterization [11] fails to extend to utility-maximization for risk-averse sellers, and establish interesting properties of regular distributions
Agent Strategies: For Sellers to Satisfy Purchase-Orders, for Buyers to Select Sellers
, 2001
"... Electronic trade introduces agents|sellers and buyers|with multiple challenges. In this paper we address one of these challenges. We provide new understandings regarding strategies that agents, each representing a buyer or a seller, can use in dynamic electronic markets. In particular, we examin ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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Electronic trade introduces agents|sellers and buyers|with multiple challenges. In this paper we address one of these challenges. We provide new understandings regarding strategies that agents, each representing a buyer or a seller, can use in dynamic electronic markets. In particular, we
Flexible Double Auctions for Electronic Commerce: Theory and Implementation
, 1998
"... We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation of val ..."
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Cited by 160 (22 self)
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We consider a general family of auction mechanisms that admit multiple buyers and sellers, and determine market-clearing prices. We analyze the economic incentives facing participants in such auctions, demonstrating that, under some conditions, it is possible to induce truthful revelation
Formation of Buyer-Seller Trade Networks in a Quality-Di¤erentiated Product Market,”Canadian
- Journal of Economics
, 2006
"... We examine the formation of buyer-seller links in an environment where exchange can only take place if such a link exists. Sellers can produce products of different qualities and multiple sellers of uniform or mixed quality can form an association to pool their customers setting uniform prices (call ..."
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Cited by 20 (1 self)
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We examine the formation of buyer-seller links in an environment where exchange can only take place if such a link exists. Sellers can produce products of different qualities and multiple sellers of uniform or mixed quality can form an association to pool their customers setting uniform prices
On the informed seller problem: Optimal information disclosure,” mimeo
, 2008
"... We consider a revenue maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell her object(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyers ’ valuations. Each buyer knows only the signal that the seller observes about him but not the signals she observes about other buyers. The seller there ..."
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Cited by 3 (0 self)
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for interdependent, for common values, and for multiple items. There disclosure policies do matter and we show that the best the seller can do is to release no information at all. This result is opposite from the celebrated linkage principle. Keywords: mechanism design, informed principal, information disclosure
Seller cheap talk in common value auctions ∗
, 2003
"... Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that revealing a complete or partial ordering of the different goods by value can be cr ..."
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Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that revealing a complete or partial ordering of the different goods by value can
Buy-Out Prices in Auctions: Seller Competition and Multi-Unit Demands
- RAND Journal of Economics
, 2008
"... Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy-out price. In one-shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy-out price, if a similar produc ..."
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Cited by 7 (0 self)
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product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy-out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, since the first item may be awarded to a
Results 1 - 10
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450
