be strengthened and rendered more effective for the new Millennium. In the 1960s and 1970s Arab donors established a variety of national and multilateral agencies. These agencies share many characteristics of their western counterparts, but some also exhibit distinctive features. Both in terms of absolute volume

and multilateral development agencies. In so doing it asks whether agencies ’ apparent reliance on the same analytical source extends to the use of the same type of instruments. It also examines how far the latter are consistent with donors ’ broader development objectives and development assistance norms

pure multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We study different trading processes in the context of a search-based model of endogenous money. We incorporate heterogeneity into the model by allowing multiple meetings of agents and divisible production. We then determine the equilibrium using three different trading mechanisms: auctions, pairwise bargaining and price posting. The welfare under these mechanisms is compared using specific functional forms for utility and cost functions. The analysis is done numerically with the bench mark of a social welfare maximising planner. (JEL: D44, D52, D83) 1.

(bilateral relational contracts). Multilateral contracts bind the rm more strongly to implicit commitments, improving motivation, but are dif cult to adjust in response to changes in the environment. Bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement. The framework helps to explain the use

Trade negotiations occur through time and between the governments of many countries. An important issue is thus whether the value of concessions that a government wins in a current negotiation may be eroded in a future bilateral negotiation to which it is not party. We identify rules of negotiation

. Allocation in the new millennium also appears more heterogeneous, and is consistent with donors shifting toward a policy of strategic development. Disaggregated aid flows are also examined. Immigration is introduced as a new variable in determining aid allocation and is shown to have a significant

reduces the incentives of trading partners for multilateral liberalization with third countries. We adress the question as to whether the results of Krishna hold, if we consider strategic link formation of countries, where countries can form bilateral PTAs as well as a multilateral agreement (e.g. GATT

Users of peer-to-peer systems are often incentivized to contribute their upload capacity in a bilateral manner: downloading is possible in return for uploading to the same peer (e.g., BitTorrent). An alternative is to use multilateral exchange to match user demand for content to available supply

impasse between rich and poor countries. The absence of the industrial sector to balance agriculture also is an impediment. Furthermore, bilateral and regional agreements have made much more progress and provide many of the gains that might eventually come from a multilateral agreement. Recent work has