### Table 7. Institutions and monetary policy

"... In PAGE 28: ...We next turn to the thesis of Ball that the years of monetary tightness occurring in some OECD economies in the early or mid-1990s elevated the equilibrium unemployment rate to a higher track. But if this is so, the nominal interest rate variable in Table7 would have turned out with a positive and significant coefficient. In Table 8 we test this contention further by first adding the change in average inflation between the two periods, then the change in the first difference of inflation and finally the change in the average slope of the yield curve.... ..."

### Table 3: Determinants of Congressional Attentiveness to Monetary Policy,

"... In PAGE 26: ... 4. Result s Regression results are reported in Table3 . Model 1 is for the entire Post - Bretton Woods period; Models 2 and 3 split the sample differently to account for changes in international capital mobility.... In PAGE 28: ... Likewise, a one standard deviation increase in REALTBIL is expected to yield a 27 percent increase in congressional activity directed at monetary policy. -- Table 5 about here -- Returning to Table3 , note that the controls for procedural norm s and rules in Congress, NEWCONG and COSPON , have large positive effects. Indeed, NEWCONG is by far the most important term in the model.... In PAGE 30: ... 29 4.1 Alternate sample dates Table3 also reports re sults using alternate sample periods (Models 2 and 3). Splitting the sample is meant to capture the influence of increasing levels of international capital mobility and to test the sensitivity of the initial results.... ..."

### Table 2 Correlations of Measures of Monetary Policy

2000

"... In PAGE 12: ... All three indicate that monetary policy was very tight following the Fed apos;s change in operating procedures in October 1979; all three suggest a relatively loose stance of policy in the period 1985-86; and all three capture the common wisdom that policy was tightened again in 1988, before being eased once more beginning in late 1989. Table2 documents the statistical correlations among the three measures. Overall, the numbers confirm the visual impressions from Figure 1, with some qualifications.... ..."

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### Table 3: Determinants of Congressional Attentiveness to Monetary Policy

"... In PAGE 23: ... a. Results The regression results are reported in Table3 . I take account of the level of capital mobility by splitting the sample into two periods: 1960-1982 (low mobility), 1983-1997 (high mobility).... ..."

### Table 6: Indicators of Effectiveness of Monetary Policy (percent)

"... In PAGE 21: ... Effectiveness We can identify three plausible objectives of monetary policy: price stability; financial depth, as a determinant of economic growth, and growth itself. Table6 provides data for 1990-94 on all three objectives- -lower inflation, greater financial depth, and higher real growth in GDP. Countries are grouped, as above, by policy stance, and it can be seen that achievement of these objectives is associated with a moderate policy stance (Group 1), suggesting that it may have been relatively tight but was not too tight.... ..."

### Table 4 Conditional Effects of Elections on Monetary Policy

"... In PAGE 21: ... Furthermore, specifications of Equation (4) that use qualitative modifying variables make it easy to test all four of the implications of Hypotheses 1M and 2M (check numbers) related to monetary policy by calculating the conditional coefficients for each relevant institutional combination (see Table 1).20 The conditional coefficients, and their associated standard errors, based on the results in Column C of table 3 are reported in upper portion of Table4 . Note that the coefficients in Table 4 are estimates of the relationship between elections and monetary policy under the various open-economy conditions presented in Table 1.... In PAGE 21: ...20 The conditional coefficients, and their associated standard errors, based on the results in Column C of table 3 are reported in upper portion of Table 4. Note that the coefficients in Table4 are estimates of the relationship between elections and monetary policy under the various open-economy conditions presented in Table 1. As Hypothesis 2M predicts, when capital is mobile there is evidence of electorally induced monetary expansions if the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate, but only when central bank independence is low.... In PAGE 21: ... In addition, there is no evidence of electorally induced monetary expansions when the exchange rate is fixed, regardless of the degree of central bank independence. [ Table4 about here] The lower portion of table 4, which reports the conditional coefficients and standard errors calculated from column A, suggests that the relationship between elections and monetary policy 20See Friedrich 1982 and Jaccard, Turrisi and Wan 1990 for a useful introduction to the conditional ... ..."

### Table 3 Conditional Effects of Elections on Monetary Policy

"... In PAGE 16: ... To determine whether expansions occur under other conditions, we must calculate conditional coefficients as described above. These are reported in Table3 , along with conditional standard errors.17 As our model predicts, when capital is mobile there is evidence of electorally induced monetary expansions if, and only if, central bank independence is low and the exchange rate is allowed to fluctuate.... ..."