This study examines the empirical relattonship between the return and the total market value of NYSE common stocks. It is found that smaller firms have had htgher risk adjusted returns, on average, than larger lirms. This ‘size effect ’ has been in existence for at least forty years and is evidence

stocks, patents to R&D, and citations to patents. We find that each ratio significantly affects market value, with an extra citation per patent boosting market value by 3%. Further findings indicate that “unpredictable ” citations have a stronger effect than the predictable portion, and that self

only the intrinsic value of the customer (i.e, the expected pro t from sales to her). We propose to model also the customer's network value: the expected pro t from sales to other customers she may inuence to buy, the customers those may inuence, and so on recursively. Instead of viewing a market

It is well known that firms are more likely to issue equity when their market values are high, relative to book and past market values, and to repurchase equity when their market values are low. We document that the resulting effects on capital structure are very persistent. As a consequence

, the framework is used to help explain how electronic markets and electronic hierarchies will allow closer integration of adjacent steps in the value added chains of our economy. The most surprising prediction is that information technology will lead to an overall shift toward proportionately more coordination

Abstract not found

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

Abstract not found

We present a simple overlapping generations model of an asset market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs both affect prices and earn higher expected returns. The unpredictability of noise traders ’ beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational

This paper reviews much of the scientific literature on the market for corporate control. The evidence indicates that corporate takeovers generate positive gains, that target firm shareholders benefit, and that bidding firm shareholders do not lose. The gains created by corporate takeovers do