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1 The Cost of Constraints: Risk Management, Agency Theory and Asset Prices

by Ashwin Alankar, Peter Blaustein, Myron S. Scholes, Ashwin Alankar, Peter Blaustein, Myron S. Scholes , 2014
"... would like to thank Ayman Hindy, Chi-fu Huang, Rustem Shaikhutdinov and Jeremy Bulow for comments and ..."
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would like to thank Ayman Hindy, Chi-fu Huang, Rustem Shaikhutdinov and Jeremy Bulow for comments and

© notice, is given to the source. Early Admissions at Selective Colleges

by Christopher Avery, Jonathan D. Levin, Christopher Avery, Jonathan D. Levin, Christopher Avery, Jonathan D. Levin , 2009
"... This paper developed out of work done independently by the authors, most importantly a paper by Avery titled "Preferences and Signaling in a Matching Market. " We thank Jeremy Bulow for suggesting a collaboration and providing detailed suggestions. Levin thanks the Toulouse Network on Info ..."
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This paper developed out of work done independently by the authors, most importantly a paper by Avery titled "Preferences and Signaling in a Matching Market. " We thank Jeremy Bulow for suggesting a collaboration and providing detailed suggestions. Levin thanks the Toulouse Network

The English Auction is Optimal among Simple Sequential Auctions

by unknown authors
"... Jeremy Bulow has turned my attention to the issues discussed here. I gratefully acknowledge his helpful comments and suggestions, as well as those of Paul Klemperer, Roy Radner, Ennio Stacchetti, Chuck Wilson, With private and affiliated buyers ’ values, the English auction maximizes the seller’s ex ..."
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Jeremy Bulow has turned my attention to the issues discussed here. I gratefully acknowledge his helpful comments and suggestions, as well as those of Paul Klemperer, Roy Radner, Ennio Stacchetti, Chuck Wilson, With private and affiliated buyers ’ values, the English auction maximizes the seller’s

Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: ∗ Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition

by E. Glen Weyl, Michal Fabinger
"... Monopoly”. While many colleagues have provided valuable and in some cases detailed comments, special debts are due to Kevin Murphy (who originally inspired the work), Tony Atkinson and Faruk Gul (for suggesting the subtitle and title of the article, respectively), Luciano de Castro and Michael Salin ..."
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Salinger (for excellent formal conference discussions), Mark Armstrong, David Atkin and Dave Donaldson (for suggesting new results), Jesse Shapiro (for suggesting ways of reframing the paper) and above all Jeremy Bulow (for more things than can be listed here). Weyl is grateful

A Theory of Bilateral Oligopoly ∗

by Kenneth Hendricks, R. Preston Mcafee , 2006
"... In horizontal mergers, concentration is often measured with the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index (HHI). This index yields the price-cost margins in Cournot competition. In many modern merger cases, both buyers and sellers have market power, and indeed, the buyers and sellers may be the same set of firms. ..."
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, the more captive production and consumption (not traded intheintermediatemarket)affects price-cost margins. The analysis is applied to spot electricity markets and to the merger of the gasoline refining and retail assets of Exxon andMobilinwesternUnitedStates. Acknowledgement: We thank Jeremy Bulow

Matching and Price Competition: Comment

by Julio González-díaz, Ron Siegel , 2009
"... We relax the assumption of symmetric linear costs in B&L’s (2006) “Matching and Price Competition ” and compare the pricing equilibrium that results to the firmoptimal competitive equilibrium. With linear and asymmetric costs, competition may not be localized in the pricing equilibrium, but all ..."
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other qualitative comparisons of B&L (2006) hold. With non-linear and symmetric costs workers ’ average utility in the pricing equilibrium may be higher than in the firm-optimal competitive equilibrium. With asymmetric and non-linear costs, firms need not choose scores from an interval Jeremy Bulow

Northwestern University

by Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel, Dmitry Orlov , 2011
"... VIEW OR PRINT IN COLOR. We measure the repo funding extended by money market funds and securities lenders to the shadow banking system, including quantities, haircuts, and repo rates sorted by the type of underlying collateral. Both the quantity and price data suggest that there was a run on repo ba ..."
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to the outstanding stock of non-Agency MBS/ABS, dealer banks with a larger exposure to private debt securities were affected more strongly and resorted to the Fed’s emergency lending programs for funding. We thank Peter Crane for providing data, and we are grateful for comments from Jeremy Bulow,

Targeted Consumer Information and Prices: The Private and Social Gains to Matching Consumers with Products

by David Reiffen , 2001
"... It is well known that product differentiation increases both prices and profits, other things equal. What is less well understood is how the distribution of consumer preferences affects firms’ incentives to differentiate their products. This paper focuses on the incentive of firms to reveal truthful ..."
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here are those of the author alone, and do not reflect those of the Federal Trade Commission, nor any Commissioner. I would like to thank Cindy Alexander, Jeremy Bulow, Dan

THE EFFECT OF EXIT ON ENTRY DETERRENCE STRATEGIES

by Abraham L. Wickelgren
"... Abstract: Recent analyses of entry deterrence strategies have required an incumbent’s post-entry output or pricing strategy to be profit maximizing. However, most papers have continued to assume that either an incumbent can commit not to exit after entry or that exit is never optimal. When there are ..."
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improving the effectiveness of others. I thank Jeremy Bulow, Ezra Friedman, Jae Nahm and seminar participants at the Federal Trade Commission and Georgetown University for helpful comments. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Federal

Waiting for News in the Market for Lemons ∗

by Brendan Daley, Brett Green , 2009
"... Trade breaks down in the market for lemons because high-type sellers have a reservation value greater than expected market value. Unraveling occurs and only the lowest types trade. Two related questions arise: What happens the next day? And, from where does the reservation value come? We model these ..."
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with sufficiently informative news, Spence’s Job Market Signaling and Akerlof’s Market for Lemons have the same unique equilibrium. The predictions help explain “irrational ” trading patterns in financial markets. The authors are greatly indebted to Jeremy Bulow, Michael Harrison and Andrzej Skrzypacz for useful
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