Results 1 - 10 of 11,750

SIA: Secure Information Aggregation in Sensor Networks

by Bartosz Przydatek, Dawn Song, Adrian Perrig , 2003
"... Sensor networks promise viable solutions to many monitoring problems. However, the practical deployment of sensor networks faces many challenges imposed by real-world demands. Sensor nodes often have limited computation and communication resources and battery power. Moreover, in many applications se ..."
Abstract - Cited by 253 (13 self) - Add to MetaCart
constraints and security issues make designing mechanisms for information aggregation in large sensor networks particularly challenging.

Information Aggregation Mechanisms: Concept, Design and . . .

by Charles Plott, Kay-Yut Chen - 1131, CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES , 2002
"... Information Aggregation Mechanisms are economics mechanisms designed explicitly for the purpose of collecting and aggregating information. The modern theory of rational expectations, together with the techniques and results of experimental economics, suggest that a set of properly designed markets c ..."
Abstract - Cited by 112 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Information Aggregation Mechanisms are economics mechanisms designed explicitly for the purpose of collecting and aggregating information. The modern theory of rational expectations, together with the techniques and results of experimental economics, suggest that a set of properly designed markets

Gossip-Based Computation of Aggregate Information

by David Kempe, Alin Dobra, Johannes Gehrke , 2003
"... between computers, and a resulting paradigm shift from centralized to highly distributed systems. With massive scale also comes massive instability, as node and link failures become the norm rather than the exception. For such highly volatile systems, decentralized gossip-based protocols are emergin ..."
Abstract - Cited by 472 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
are emerging as an approach to maintaining simplicity and scalability while achieving fault-tolerant information dissemination.

Foundations of Information Aggregation Mechanisms

by Eiichiro Kazumori , 2004
"... A recent innovation in market design is the use of the market mechanism to aggregate private information to forecaset future events. In this paper I consider conditions for information aggregation in parimutuel pricing systems. ..."
Abstract - Cited by 1 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
A recent innovation in market design is the use of the market mechanism to aggregate private information to forecaset future events. In this paper I consider conditions for information aggregation in parimutuel pricing systems.

Efficiency and Information Aggregation in Auctions

by Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Jeroen M. Swinkels, Firstdraft December, Thisdraft October , 1996
"... There is an underlying tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation in markets. We explore this in the context of an auction in which k objects are auctioned off to n bidders. The objects are identical, but of unknown quality. In addition, bidders differ in their taste for an ob ..."
Abstract - Cited by 19 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
There is an underlying tension between allocative efficiency and information aggregation in markets. We explore this in the context of an auction in which k objects are auctioned off to n bidders. The objects are identical, but of unknown quality. In addition, bidders differ in their taste

Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation

by Author(s) Timothy Feddersen, Wolfgang Pesendorfer, Feddersen, Wolfgang Pesendorfer - in Elections with Private Information,” Econometrica , 1997
"... Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at ..."
Abstract - Cited by 60 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation

by Mehmet Ekmekci, Stephan Lauermann , 2015
"... We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a in state A and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal that is ..."
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We study information aggregation with a biased election organizer who recruits voters at some cost. Voters are symmetric ex-ante and prefer policy a in state A and policy b in state B, but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state. Each recruited voter observes a private signal

Information Aggregation in Polls

by John Morgan, Phillip C. Stocken , 2007
"... We study a model of information transmission via polling. A policy maker polls constituents to obtain information about a payoff relevant state variable and then chooses a policy that affects the welfare of all in the polity. Constituents, who differ in their ideologies, receive private signals abou ..."
Abstract - Cited by 13 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
ideologies, full information aggregation can arise in an equilibrium where constituents endogenously sort themselves so that centrists answer truthfully while extremists bias their responses to the pollster; in contrast, when the policy maker is ideologically isolated, information aggregation is impossible

Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation

by Ettore Damiano, Li Hao, Wing Suen , 2007
"... Abstract. We study a model of collective decision making in which divergent preferences of the agents make information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting. With costly delay, we show that repeated voting can help the agents reach a mutually preferred decision, even though there is no ..."
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Abstract. We study a model of collective decision making in which divergent preferences of the agents make information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting. With costly delay, we show that repeated voting can help the agents reach a mutually preferred decision, even though

Delay in Strategic Information Aggregation

by Presented Li, Ettore Damiano, Li Hao, Wing Suen , 2007
"... Abstract. We study a model of collective decision making in which divergent preferences of the agents make information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting. With costly delay, we show that repeated voting can help the agents reach a mutually preferred decision, even though there is no ..."
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Abstract. We study a model of collective decision making in which divergent preferences of the agents make information aggregation impossible in a single round of voting. With costly delay, we show that repeated voting can help the agents reach a mutually preferred decision, even though
Results 1 - 10 of 11,750