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17
Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios
"... Abstract. We study set-system auctions whereby a single buyer wants to purchase Q items of some commodity. There are multiple sellers, each of whom has some known number of items, and a private cost for supplying those items. Thus a “feasible set ” of sellers (a set that is able to comprise the winn ..."
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Cited by 1 (1 self)
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the winning bidders) is any set of sellers whose total quantity sums to at least Q. Weshowthat,eveninalimitedspecialcase,VCG has a frugality ratio of at least n−1 (withrespecttotheNTUminbenchmark) and that this matches the upper bound for any set-system auction. We show a lower bound on the frugality of any
Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanism for vertex cover
, 2008
"... In set-system auctions, there is a task than can be completed by several overlapping teams of selfish agents, and the centre’s goal is to hire one of these teams and pay as little as possible. Examples of this setting include shortest-path auctions and vertex-cover auctions. Recently, paper [15] i ..."
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Cited by 12 (2 self)
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] introduced a new definition of frugality ratio for this problem. Informally, the “frugality ratio ” is the ratio of the total payment of a mechanism to a desired payment bound. The ratio captures the extent to which the mechanism overpays, relative to perceived fair cost. In this paper, we propose a new
Using Nash Implementation to Achieve Better Frugality Ratios
"... Abstract. Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish agents maximize their utility by truthfully revealing their types. It has been pointed out that these truthful me ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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mechanisms, the famous among them being the VCG mechanisms, often incur high payments and fruglity ratios. In this work, we exploit the solution concept of Nash implementation to overcome this problem. Our mechanisms induce a set of Nash equilibria so that selfish agents have incentive to act based on a Nash
Beyond VCG: Frugality of truthful mechanisms
- In Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
, 2005
"... We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which the auctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As common in the field of mechanism design, we assume that the agents are selfish and will act in such a way as to maximize their profit, wh ..."
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Cited by 55 (5 self)
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, which in particular may include misrepresenting their true incurred cost. Our first contribution is a new and natural definition of the frugality ratio of a mechanism, measuring the amount by which a mechanism “overpays”, and extending previous definitions to all monopoly-free set systems. After
Beyond VCG: Frugality of Truthful Mechanisms
"... Abstract We study truthful mechanisms for auctions in which theauctioneer is trying to hire a team of agents to perform a complex task, and paying them for their work. As com-mon in the field of mechanism design, we assume that the agents are selfish and will act in such a way as to maximizetheir pr ..."
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profit, which in particular may include misrepresenting their true incurred cost. Our first contribution is a newand natural definition of the frugality ratio of a mechanism, measuring the amount by which a mechanism "overpays",and extending previous definitions to all monopoly-free set
Back to original frugality
, 2013
"... We review recent research on frugality of mechanisms for the procurement of a spanning network. Frugality here is defined as the ratio of the maximum price that can be charged to the buyer in some equilibrium to the true minimal cost. Previous negative results are qualified under natural restriction ..."
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We review recent research on frugality of mechanisms for the procurement of a spanning network. Frugality here is defined as the ratio of the maximum price that can be charged to the buyer in some equilibrium to the true minimal cost. Previous negative results are qualified under natural
Frugal hypothesis testing and classification
, 2010
"... The design and analysis of decision rules using detection theory and statistical learning theory is important because decision making under uncertainty is pervasive. Three perspectives on limiting the complexity of decision rules are considered in this thesis: geometric regularization, dimensionalit ..."
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Cited by 7 (2 self)
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for information fusion in sensor networks. A new distortion is proposed for the quantization or clustering of prior probabilities appearing in the thresholds of likelihood ratio tests. This distortion is given the name mean Bayes risk error (MBRE). The quantization framework is extended to model human decision
Frugal Routing on Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks
"... Abstract. We study game-theoretic mechanisms for routing in ad-hoc networks. Game-theoretic mechanisms capture the non-cooperative and selfish behavior of nodes in a resource-constrained environment. There have been some recent proposals to use incentive-based mechanisms (in particular, VCG) for rou ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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exhibits small frugality ratio (i.e., overpayment) with high probability. In addition, we study a more realistic generalization where sets of agents can form communities to maximize total profit. We also analyze the performance of VCG under such a community model and show similar bounds. While some recent
Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents
"... In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s sec ..."
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Cited by 232 (3 self)
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algorithms (greedy load-balancing or the PTAS) cannot be used in truthful mechanisms. We show our mechanism to be frugal, in that the total payment needed is only a logarithmic factor more than the actual costs incurred by the machines, unless one machine dominates the total processing power. We also give
Tight approximation bounds for greedy frugal coverage algorithms
"... Abstract. We consider the frugal coverage problem, an interesting vari-ation of set cover defined as follows. Instances of the problem consist of a universe of elements and a collection of sets over these elements; the objective is to compute a subcollection of sets so that the number of elements it ..."
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Abstract. We consider the frugal coverage problem, an interesting vari-ation of set cover defined as follows. Instances of the problem consist of a universe of elements and a collection of sets over these elements; the objective is to compute a subcollection of sets so that the number of elements
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