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Simulating Physics with Computers
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 1982
"... A digital computer is generally believed to be an efficient universal computing device; that is, it is believed able to simulate any physical computing device with an increase in computation time of at most a polynomial factor. This may not be true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. ..."
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Cited by 601 (1 self)
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computer. These algorithms take a number of steps polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. AMS subject classifications: 82P10, 11Y05, 68Q10. 1 Introduction One of the first results in the mathematics of computation, which underlies the subsequent development
Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring
, 1994
"... A computer is generally considered to be a universal computational device; i.e., it is believed able to simulate any physical computational device with a increase in computation time of at most a polynomial factor. It is not clear whether this is still true when quantum mechanics is taken into consi ..."
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Cited by 1103 (7 self)
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of steps which is polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. These two problems are generally considered hard on a classical computer and have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. (We thus give the first examples of quantum cryptanalysis.) 1
NonMalleable Cryptography
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 2000
"... The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. ..."
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Cited by 490 (21 self)
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system users. Our cryptosystem is the first proven to be secure against a strong type of chosen ciphertext attack proposed by Rackoff and Simon, in which the attacker knows the ciphertext she wishes to break and can query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext other than the target.
Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. Technical Report 2003/235, Cryptology ePrint archive, http://eprint.iacr.org, 2006. Previous version appeared at EUROCRYPT 2004
 34 [DRS07] [DS05] [EHMS00] [FJ01] Yevgeniy Dodis, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam
, 2004
"... We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for • turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, • reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying mater ..."
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Cited by 532 (38 self)
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material that, unlike traditional cryptographic keys, is (1) not reproducible precisely and (2) not distributed uniformly. We propose two primitives: a fuzzy extractor reliably extracts nearly uniform randomness R from its input; the extraction is errortolerant in the sense that R will be the same even
PseudoRandom Generation from OneWay Functions
 PROC. 20TH STOC
, 1988
"... Pseudorandom generators are fundamental to many theoretical and applied aspects of computing. We show howto construct a pseudorandom generator from any oneway function. Since it is easy to construct a oneway function from a pseudorandom generator, this result shows that there is a pseudorandom gene ..."
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Cited by 887 (22 self)
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Pseudorandom generators are fundamental to many theoretical and applied aspects of computing. We show howto construct a pseudorandom generator from any oneway function. Since it is easy to construct a oneway function from a pseudorandom generator, this result shows that there is a pseudorandom
Breaking and Fixing the NeedhamSchroeder PublicKey Protocol using FDR
, 1996
"... In this paper we analyse the well known NeedhamSchroeder PublicKey Protocol using FDR, a refinement checker for CSP. We use FDR to discover an attack upon the protocol, which allows an intruder to impersonate another agent. We adapt the protocol, and then use FDR to show that the new protocol is s ..."
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Cited by 716 (13 self)
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In this paper we analyse the well known NeedhamSchroeder PublicKey Protocol using FDR, a refinement checker for CSP. We use FDR to discover an attack upon the protocol, which allows an intruder to impersonate another agent. We adapt the protocol, and then use FDR to show that the new protocol
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
 Information and Computation
, 1999
"... We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the ..."
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Cited by 919 (55 self)
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We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the spi calculus enables us to consider cryptographic issues in more detail. We represent protocols as processes in the spi calculus and state their security properties in terms of coarsegrained notions of protocol equivalence.
Random Oracles are Practical: A Paradigm for Designing Efficient Protocols
, 1995
"... We argue that the random oracle model  where all parties have access to a public random oracle  provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol P R for the ..."
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Cited by 1643 (75 self)
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We argue that the random oracle model  where all parties have access to a public random oracle  provides a bridge between cryptographic theory and cryptographic practice. In the paradigm we suggest, a practical protocol P is produced by first devising and proving correct a protocol P R
A KeyManagement Scheme for Distributed Sensor Networks
 In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
, 2002
"... Distributed Sensor Networks (DSNs) are adhoc mobile networks that include sensor nodes with limited computation and communication capabilities. DSNs are dynamic in the sense that they allow addition and deletion of sensor nodes after deployment to grow the network or replace failing and unreliable ..."
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Cited by 901 (11 self)
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Distributed Sensor Networks (DSNs) are adhoc mobile networks that include sensor nodes with limited computation and communication capabilities. DSNs are dynamic in the sense that they allow addition and deletion of sensor nodes after deployment to grow the network or replace failing and unreliable
Secure Group Communications Using Key Graphs
, 1998
"... Many emerging applications (e.g., teleconference, realtime information services, pay per view, distributed interactive simulation, and collaborative work) are based upon a group communications model, i.e., they require packet delivery from one or more authorized senders to a very large number of au ..."
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Cited by 552 (17 self)
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Many emerging applications (e.g., teleconference, realtime information services, pay per view, distributed interactive simulation, and collaborative work) are based upon a group communications model, i.e., they require packet delivery from one or more authorized senders to a very large number
Results 1  10
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