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Timing Attacks on Implementations of DiffieHellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems
, 1996
"... By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operations, attackers may be able to find fixed DiffieHellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against a vulnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known cip ..."
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Cited by 644 (3 self)
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By carefully measuring the amount of time required to perform private key operations, attackers may be able to find fixed DiffieHellman exponents, factor RSA keys, and break other cryptosystems. Against a vulnerable system, the attack is computationally inexpensive and often requires only known
Simulating Physics with Computers
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 1982
"... A digital computer is generally believed to be an efficient universal computing device; that is, it is believed able to simulate any physical computing device with an increase in computation time of at most a polynomial factor. This may not be true when quantum mechanics is taken into consideration. ..."
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Cited by 601 (1 self)
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computer. These algorithms take a number of steps polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. AMS subject classifications: 82P10, 11Y05, 68Q10. 1 Introduction One of the first results in the mathematics of computation, which underlies the subsequent development
Algorithms for Quantum Computation: Discrete Logarithms and Factoring
, 1994
"... A computer is generally considered to be a universal computational device; i.e., it is believed able to simulate any physical computational device with a increase in computation time of at most a polynomial factor. It is not clear whether this is still true when quantum mechanics is taken into consi ..."
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Cited by 1103 (7 self)
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of steps which is polynomial in the input size, e.g., the number of digits of the integer to be factored. These two problems are generally considered hard on a classical computer and have been used as the basis of several proposed cryptosystems. (We thus give the first examples of quantum cryptanalysis.) 1
Random key predistribution schemes for sensor networks
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2003 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY
, 2003
"... Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using the ..."
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Cited by 813 (14 self)
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Key establishment in sensor networks is a challenging problem because asymmetric key cryptosystems are unsuitable for use in resource constrained sensor nodes, and also because the nodes could be physically compromised by an adversary. We present three new mechanisms for key establishment using
NonMalleable Cryptography
 SIAM Journal on Computing
, 2000
"... The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. ..."
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Cited by 490 (21 self)
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system users. Our cryptosystem is the first proven to be secure against a strong type of chosen ciphertext attack proposed by Rackoff and Simon, in which the attacker knows the ciphertext she wishes to break and can query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext other than the target.
New Directions in Cryptography
, 1976
"... Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryptography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocessing have given rise to a need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimize the need for secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. This paper sug ..."
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Cited by 3499 (7 self)
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Two kinds of contemporary developments in cryptography are examined. Widening applications of teleprocessing have given rise to a need for new types of cryptographic systems, which minimize the need for secure key distribution channels and supply the equivalent of a written signature. This paper
PseudoRandom Generation from OneWay Functions
 PROC. 20TH STOC
, 1988
"... Pseudorandom generators are fundamental to many theoretical and applied aspects of computing. We show howto construct a pseudorandom generator from any oneway function. Since it is easy to construct a oneway function from a pseudorandom generator, this result shows that there is a pseudorandom gene ..."
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Cited by 887 (22 self)
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Pseudorandom generators are fundamental to many theoretical and applied aspects of computing. We show howto construct a pseudorandom generator from any oneway function. Since it is easy to construct a oneway function from a pseudorandom generator, this result shows that there is a pseudorandom
Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. Technical Report 2003/235, Cryptology ePrint archive, http://eprint.iacr.org, 2006. Previous version appeared at EUROCRYPT 2004
 34 [DRS07] [DS05] [EHMS00] [FJ01] Yevgeniy Dodis, Leonid Reyzin, and Adam
, 2004
"... We provide formal definitions and efficient secure techniques for • turning noisy information into keys usable for any cryptographic application, and, in particular, • reliably and securely authenticating biometric data. Our techniques apply not just to biometric information, but to any keying mater ..."
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Cited by 532 (38 self)
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material that, unlike traditional cryptographic keys, is (1) not reproducible precisely and (2) not distributed uniformly. We propose two primitives: a fuzzy extractor reliably extracts nearly uniform randomness R from its input; the extraction is errortolerant in the sense that R will be the same even
Data Security
, 1979
"... The rising abuse of computers and increasing threat to personal privacy through data banks have stimulated much interest m the techmcal safeguards for data. There are four kinds of safeguards, each related to but distract from the others. Access controls regulate which users may enter the system and ..."
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Cited by 611 (3 self)
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and subsequently whmh data sets an active user may read or wrote. Flow controls regulate the dissemination of values among the data sets accessible to a user. Inference controls protect statistical databases by preventing questioners from deducing confidential information by posing carefully designed sequences
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
 Information and Computation
, 1999
"... We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the ..."
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Cited by 919 (55 self)
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We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols
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