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Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios

by Paul W. Goldberg, Antony Mccabe
"... Abstract. We study set-system auctions whereby a single buyer wants to purchase Q items of some commodity. There are multiple sellers, each of whom has some known number of items, and a private cost for supplying those items. Thus a “feasible set ” of sellers (a set that is able to comprise the winn ..."
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Abstract. We study set-system auctions whereby a single buyer wants to purchase Q items of some commodity. There are multiple sellers, each of whom has some known number of items, and a private cost for supplying those items. Thus a “feasible set ” of sellers (a set that is able to comprise

An efficient dynamic auction for heterogeneous commodities

by M. Ausubel, Ken Binmore, Peter Cramton, John Ledyard, Paul Milgrom, Thayer Morrill, Ennio Stacchetti - The American Economic Review , 2006
"... This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of current prices, bidders report quantities demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts t ..."
Abstract - Cited by 106 (9 self) - Add to MetaCart
This article proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities. An auctioneer wishes to allocate K types of commodities among n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of current prices, bidders report quantities demanded at these prices, and the auctioneer adjusts

Asymmetric auctions

by Eric Maskin, John Riley - REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES , 1998
"... The revenue-equivalence theorem 1 for auctions predicts that expected seller revenue is independent of the bidding rules, as long as equilibrium has the properties that the buyer with the highest reservation price wins and any buyer with the lowest possible reservation price has zero expected surplu ..."
Abstract - Cited by 155 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
that rarely is any given kind of commodity sold through more than one sort of auction. Thus, for example, art is nearly always auctioned off according to the English rules, whereas job contracts are normally awarded through sealed bids. Admittedly, in the public sector, there have been a few attempts to use

An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities

by Professor Lawrence, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel, Lawrence M. Ausubel - Department of Economics, University of Maryland , 2000
"... This paper proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities, generalizing earlier work that treated identical objects. An auctioneer wishes to allocate one or more units of each of K heterogeneous commodities to n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector of curren ..."
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This paper proposes a new dynamic design for auctioning multiple heterogeneous commodities, generalizing earlier work that treated identical objects. An auctioneer wishes to allocate one or more units of each of K heterogeneous commodities to n bidders. The auctioneer announces a vector

Economic Models for Resource Management and Scheduling in Grid Computing

by Rajkumar Buyya, David Abramson, Jonathan Giddy, Heinz Stockinger , 2002
"... The accelerated development in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) and Grid computing has positioned them as promising next generation computing platforms. They enable the creation of Virtual Enterprises (VE) for sharing resources distributed across the world. However, resource management, application development an ..."
Abstract - Cited by 259 (24 self) - Add to MetaCart
functions through trading and brokering services. In a real world market, there exist various economic models for setting the price of services based on supply-and-demand and their value to the user. They include commodity market, posted price, tender and auction models. In this paper, we discuss the use

Procuring Commodities: Request for Quote or Reverse Auctions?1

by Jason Shachat , 2009
"... Abstract: We examine the relative performances of reverse auctions and request for quotes in a simple commodity environment. Enterprises embarking on a reverse auction initiative often start with their commodity purchases. We conduct laboratory experiments and find that this is a poor starting poin ..."
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Abstract: We examine the relative performances of reverse auctions and request for quotes in a simple commodity environment. Enterprises embarking on a reverse auction initiative often start with their commodity purchases. We conduct laboratory experiments and find that this is a poor starting

Commodity Arbitrage and the Law of One Price: Setting the Record Straight

by John Pippenger , 2016
"... Abstract A general consensus rejects effective commodity arbitrage and the law of one price. But this consensus is mistaken because it is based on research using retail prices where price differentials do not represent risk-free profits. Using commodity auction prices, a few articles support effect ..."
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Abstract A general consensus rejects effective commodity arbitrage and the law of one price. But this consensus is mistaken because it is based on research using retail prices where price differentials do not represent risk-free profits. Using commodity auction prices, a few articles support

Commodity trading using an agent-based iterated double auction

by Chris Preist - In Proceedings of the 3rd Annual Conference on Autonomous Agents (AA’99 , 1999
"... This paper describes a new agent-based market mechanism for commodity trading via the Internet. This institution combines the best properties of the continuous double auction and the call auction, but does not suffer from their disadvantages. The institution consists of a marketplace, and a set of a ..."
Abstract - Cited by 28 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper describes a new agent-based market mechanism for commodity trading via the Internet. This institution combines the best properties of the continuous double auction and the call auction, but does not suffer from their disadvantages. The institution consists of a marketplace, and a set

Agent-Human Interactions in the Continuous Double Auction

by Rajarshi Das , James E. Hanson, Jeffrey O. Kephart, Gerald Tesauro - IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE , 2001
"... The Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is the dominant market institution for real-world trading of equities, commodities, derivatives, etc. We describe a series of laboratory experiments that, for the first time, allow human subjects to interact with software bidding agents in a CDA. Our bidding ..."
Abstract - Cited by 100 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
The Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is the dominant market institution for real-world trading of equities, commodities, derivatives, etc. We describe a series of laboratory experiments that, for the first time, allow human subjects to interact with software bidding agents in a CDA. Our bidding

Do explicit warnings eliminate the hypothetical bias in elicitation procedures? Evidence from field auctions for sportscards

by A. List, Ronald G. Cummings, Thank Laura Taylor, Ronald Cummings For Providing, I Thank Craig Gallet, Charles Holt, Matthew Rabin, Jason Shogren, Mark Strazicich - American Economic Review , 2001
"... The goal of environmental policy is to protect the well-being of humans and the ecosystems vital to human existence. Because benefit-cost analyses are now required at the federal level, and increasingly at the state level, much attention has been paid to the development of practical, credible approa ..."
Abstract - Cited by 144 (37 self) - Add to MetaCart
and services. Arguably the most contentious of these approaches is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), which allows the researcher to measure the total value of the commodity in question (see Peter A. Diamond and Jerry A. Hausman's [1994] critical review). Chief amongst these concems is whether
Results 1 - 10 of 172