"... In PAGE 10: ...able 5-3 CLDC Packages ............................................................................................33 Table12 -1 Sales agents sent out.... In PAGE 10: ...able 12-1 Sales agents sent out....................................................................................67 Table12... In PAGE 77: ...Anne 475 2 Peder 600 3 Knut 550 1 Alf Inge 520 2 Reidar 580 3 Table12 -1 Sales agents sent out When the buyer agent was recalled, it returned 490 as the best accepted offer. The agent that accepted that offer was owned by Cecilie.... In PAGE 77: ... 12.2 Test case 2 Table12 -2 shows the nine buyer agent started for this test case. In addition, a sales agent was started from a mobile device emulator.... In PAGE 78: ... 68 Lars Erik 500 1 Anne 475 2 Peder 600 3 Knut 550 1 Alf Inge 520 2 Reidar 580 3 Table12 -2 Sent out buyer agents. When the sales agent returned, the best bid was 522, which was made by Reidar.... ..."

"... In PAGE 7: ...4 Therefore, one should expect to see at most small effects of price controls on efficiency. We therefore use a third demand-supply schedule shown in Table3 , where the efficiency is only 56 percent if all units are traded to increase the possibility of observing the efficiency effect of price controls. 2.... In PAGE 10: ...63; otherwise the effect of ceiling on the distribution of transaction prices is essentially the same. Finally, we repeated the simulations after adding extramarginal traders (see Table3 and Section 2.3 above).... ..."

"... In PAGE 8: ... The markets have either four or six buyers and six sellers who, at a CE, exchange a total of twelve units in each market. Figure 3 displays buyer pro t tables generated by the parameter values shown in Table1 for a six-buyer market. Figure 4 displays buyer pro t tables for a four- buyer market.... In PAGE 9: ... However, this means that the CE price gap between markets will be altered. When replicating the basic market designs shown in Table1 , we varied: (1) the designation of A or B as the market with the higher (lower) CE price, and (2) the absolute size of the CE price gap (jP A ? P Bj = 2:80, 3:50, or 4:20), holding the ratio of CE prices constant at 2:077. The latter was accomplished by multiplying the token endowments and CE prices (P A; P B) shown in Table 1 by either 0:8 or 1:2 and shifting the supply arrays by an additive constant such that SA(P A) = SB(P ... In PAGE 9: ... When replicating the basic market designs shown in Table 1, we varied: (1) the designation of A or B as the market with the higher (lower) CE price, and (2) the absolute size of the CE price gap (jP A ? P Bj = 2:80, 3:50, or 4:20), holding the ratio of CE prices constant at 2:077. The latter was accomplished by multiplying the token endowments and CE prices (P A; P B) shown in Table1 by either 0:8 or 1:2 and shifting the supply arrays by an additive constant such that SA(P A) = SB(P ... In PAGE 18: ... We thus conclude that none of the design treatments have a consistent, robust e ect on market behavior. Individual buyer behavior The buyer parameter sets used in our experimental designs ( Table1 ) were initialized so that two buyers were assigned CE commodity bundles consisting of high-price and low-price units as follows: (Ai; Bi) = (1; 3), (2; 2), or (3; 1) in the six- buyer design and (Ai; Bi) = (2; 4) or (4; 2) in the four-buyer design. The buyers paired at a particular CE bundle had di erent elasticities of substitution, either ?1:33 ( = 0:25) or ?4 ( = 0:75); the latter implying increased commodity substitutability and atter indi erence contours.... ..."

"... In PAGE 8: ... The markets have either four or six buyers and six sellers who, at a CE, exchange a total of twelve units in each market. Figure 3 displays buyer pro t tables generated by the parameter values shown in Table1 for a six-buyer market. Figure 4 displays buyer pro t tables for a four- buyer market.... In PAGE 9: ... However, this means that the CE price gap between markets will be altered. When replicating the basic market designs shown in Table1 , wevaried: (1) the designation of A or B as the market with the higher (lower) CE price, and (2) the absolute size of the CE price gap (jP A ; P B j = 2:80, 3:50, or 4:20), holding the ratio of CE prices constant at 2:077. The latter was accomplished bymultiplying the token endowments and CE prices (P A ;;P B ) shown in Table 1 by either 0:8 or 1:2 and shifting the supply arrays by an additive constant such that S A (P A )=S B (P B... In PAGE 9: ... When replicating the basic market designs shown in Table 1, wevaried: (1) the designation of A or B as the market with the higher (lower) CE price, and (2) the absolute size of the CE price gap (jP A ; P B j = 2:80, 3:50, or 4:20), holding the ratio of CE prices constant at 2:077. The latter was accomplished bymultiplying the token endowments and CE prices (P A ;;P B ) shown in Table1 by either 0:8 or 1:2 and shifting the supply arrays by an additive constant such that S A (P A )=S B (P B... In PAGE 18: ... Wethus conclude that none of the design treatments have a consistent, robust e ect on market behavior. Individual buyer behavior The buyer parameter sets used in our experimental designs ( Table1 ) were initialized so that two buyers were assigned CE commodity bundles consisting of high-price and low-price units as follows: (A i ;;B i ) = (1;; 3), (2;; 2), or (3;; 1) in the six- buyer design and (A i ;;B i )=(2;; 4) or (4;; 2) in the four-buyer design. The buyers paired at a particular CE bundle had di erent elasticities of substitution, either ;1:33 ( =0:25) or ;4 ( =0:75);; the latter implying increased commodity substitutability and atter indi erence contours.... ..."

"... In PAGE 7: ... The markets have either four or six buyers and six sellers who, at a CE, exchange a total of twelve units in eachmarket. Figure 3 displays buyer pro#0Ct tables generated by the parameter values shown in Table1 for a six-buyer market. Figure 4 displays buyer pro#0Ct tables for a four- buyer market.... In PAGE 7: ... However, this means that the CE price gap between markets will be altered. When replicating the basic market designs shown in Table1 , wevaried: #281#29 the designation of A or B as the market with the higher #28lower#29 CE price, and #282#29 the absolute size of the CE price gap #28jP #03 A , P #03 B j = 2:80, 3:50, or 4:20#29, holding the ratio of CE prices... In PAGE 8: ...7 CE prices #28P #03 A ;P #03 B #29 shown in Table1 by either 0:8 or 1:2 and shifting the supply arrays by an additive constant such that S A #28P #03 A #29=S B #28P #03 B #29=12. The e#0Bects of this rescaling on price dynamics are, a priori, unclear but our working hypothesis is that dynamics will be una#0Bected by the CE price gap di#0Berential.... In PAGE 12: ... Wethus conclude that none of the design treatments have a consistent, robust e#0Bect on market behavior. Individual buyer behavior The buyer parameter sets used in our experimental designs #28 Table1 #29 were initialized so that two buyers were assigned CE commodity bundles consisting of high-price and low-price units as follows: #28A i ;B i #29 = #281; 3#29, #282; 2#29, or #283; 1#29 in the six- buyer design and #28A i ;B i #29=#282; 4#29 or #284; 2#29 in the four-buyer design. The buyers paired at a particular CE bundle had di#0Berent elasticities of substitution, either ,1:33 #28#1A =0:25#29 or ,4 #28#1A =0:75#29; the latter implying increased commodity substitutability and #0Datter indi#0Berence contours.... ..."

"... In PAGE 10: ...able 5-3 CLDC Packages ............................................................................................33 Table12 -1 Sales agents sent out.... In PAGE 10: ...able 12-1 Sales agents sent out....................................................................................67 Table12... In PAGE 77: ... Network test 12.1 Test case 1 Table12 -1 shows the nine sales agent started for this test case. In addition, a buyer agent was started, using a mobile device emulator.... In PAGE 77: ... The maximum bid of the mobile agent was set to 700. User id Minimum price First server Cecilie 430 1 Christine 450 2 Linda 440 3 Lars Erik 500 1 Anne 475 2 Peder 600 3 Knut 550 1 Alf Inge 520 2 Reidar 580 3 Table12 -1 Sales agents sent out When the buyer agent was recalled, it returned 490 as the best accepted offer. The agent that accepted that offer was owned by Cecilie.... In PAGE 78: ... 68 Lars Erik 500 1 Anne 475 2 Peder 600 3 Knut 550 1 Alf Inge 520 2 Reidar 580 3 Table12 -2 Sent out buyer agents. When the sales agent returned, the best bid was 522, which was made by Reidar.... ..."

"... In PAGE 22: ... Even in the simplistic model estimated, however, increased aggregate interest in car ownership could not be ruled out a priori. Taking the restriction factor of 90% as a point of reference, however ( Table4 ), the model indicates that interest in car ownership would fall by about two percent (8 percent of car owners would sell, 6 percent would buy). In contrast, the model based on time series analysis of aggregate gasoline demand - the only one which includes analysis of post-regulation behavior - indicates that the use of cars were increased.... In PAGE 31: ...2 Car Ownership: Actual versus Predicted Predicted No Car I Car 2 Cars Total No Car 654 36 4 694 Actual 1 Car 172 60 17 249 2 Cars 25 38 31 94 Total 851 134 52 1037 Finally, while using a restriction factor of 0.8, as is used in Figures 4a and 4b, 33 come out as sellers, while 38 of the one-car households would want an additional car (these figures are reflected in Table4 , line 4). As predicted percentages of the stock of cars among the 1037 households,... ..."

"... In PAGE 5: ....3. The example sets Each Buyer is given the same set of Buyer examples, and each Seller given the same set of Seller examples. The Buyer example set is given in Table2 and the Seller example set is given in Table 3. Table 2.... ..."