We describe efficient techniques for a number of parties to jointly generate an RSA key. At the end of the protocol an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. None of the parties know the factorization of N. In addition a public encryption exponent is publicly known and each party holds a share

Abstract. In this paper, secure two-party protocols are provided in order to securely generate a random k-bit RSA modulus n keeping its factorization secret. We first show that most existing two-party protocols based on Boneh’s test are not correct: an RSA modulus can be output in the malicious

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signatures to generate undeniable signatures. In this new setting, both the signature and verification exponents of RSA are kept secret by the signer, while the public key consists of a composite modulus and a sample RSA signature on a single public message. Our scheme possesses several attractive properties

We describe an implementation of a distributed algorithm to generate a shared RSA key. At the end of the computation, an RSA modulus N = pq is publicly known. All servers involved in the computation are convinced that N is a product of two large primes, however none of them know the factorization

. We present a protocol for two parties to generate an RSA key in a distributed manner. At the end of the protocol the public key: a modulus N = PQ, and an encryption exponent e are known to both parties. Individually, neither party obtains information about the decryption key d and the prime

special assumption on the RSA modulus and this kind of RSA moduli cannot be easily generated in an efficient way with many players. Of course, it is still possible to call theoretical results on multiparty computation, but we cannot hope to design efficient protocols. The only practical result to generate

The moduli used in RSA (see [5]) can be generated by many di#erent sources. The generator of that modulus knows its factorization. They have the ability to forge signatures or break any system based on this moduli. If a moduli and the RSA parameters associated with it were generated by a reputable

of attacks, e.g., that an RSA modulus is resistant to elliptic-curve-based factoring attacks. This approach results in a rather unsatisfying laundry list of security tests for keys. We propose a new approach that we refer to as key generation with verifiable randomness (KEGVER). Our aim is to show in zero

At Crypto'97 Boneh and Franklin proposed a protocol to efficiently generate shared RSA keys. In the case of two parties, the drawback of their scheme is the need of an independent third party. Furthermore, the security is guaranteed only if the three players follow the protocol. In this paper