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A New Derandomization of Auctions
"... Abstract. Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, singleitem auction, which given a bidvector b ∈ [h] n, has expected profit E[P (b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bidvector b, guarantees a profit of E[P (b)]/4 − O(h). In th ..."
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Abstract. Let A be a randomized, unlimited supply, unit demand, singleitem auction, which given a bidvector b ∈ [h] n, has expected profit E[P (b)]. Aggarwal et al. showed that given A, there exists a deterministic auction which given a bidvector b, guarantees a profit of E[P (b)]/4 − O
Hats, auctions and derandomization
"... We investigate derandomizations of digital good randomized auctions. We propose a general derandomization method which can be used to show that for every random auction there exists a deterministic auction having asymptotically the same revenue. In addition, we construct an explicit optimal determin ..."
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We investigate derandomizations of digital good randomized auctions. We propose a general derandomization method which can be used to show that for every random auction there exists a deterministic auction having asymptotically the same revenue. In addition, we construct an explicit optimal
Parameterized Complexity
, 1998
"... the rapidly developing systematic connections between FPT and useful heuristic algorithms  a new and exciting bridge between the theory of computing and computing in practice. The organizers of the seminar strongly believe that knowledge of parameterized complexity techniques and results belongs ..."
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Cited by 1218 (75 self)
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the rapidly developing systematic connections between FPT and useful heuristic algorithms  a new and exciting bridge between the theory of computing and computing in practice. The organizers of the seminar strongly believe that knowledge of parameterized complexity techniques and results belongs into the toolkit of every algorithm designer. The purpose of the seminar was to bring together leading experts from all over the world, and from the diverse areas of computer science that have been attracted to this new framework. The seminar was intended as the rst larger international meeting with a specic focus on parameterized complexity, and it hopefully serves as a driving force in the development of the eld. 1 We had 49 participants from Australia, Canada, India, Israel, New Zealand, USA, and various European countries. During the workshop 25 lectures were given. Moreover, one night session was devoted to open problems and Thursday was basically used for problem discussion
ACADEMIC AWARDS
, 1996
"... Description: Worked on mechanism design problems, including derandomization of auctions and limitedsupply attribute auctions. ..."
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Description: Worked on mechanism design problems, including derandomization of auctions and limitedsupply attribute auctions.
Auctions with budget constraints
 In 9th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory (SWAT
, 2004
"... Abstract. In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily an addit ..."
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Cited by 33 (1 self)
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Abstract. In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy
, 2011
"... We consider the problem of designing a revenuemaximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size of the support. ..."
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Cited by 27 (4 self)
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We consider the problem of designing a revenuemaximizing auction for a single item, when the values of the bidders are drawn from a correlated distribution. We observe that there exists an algorithm that finds the optimal randomized mechanism that runs in time polynomial in the size of the support
Inapproximability for vcgbased combinatorial auctions
"... The existence of incentivecompatible, computationallyefficient mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with good approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. It is believed that, in many cases, good approximations for combinatorial auctions may be unattainable due ..."
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Cited by 24 (8 self)
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The existence of incentivecompatible, computationallyefficient mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with good approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in algorithmic mechanism design. It is believed that, in many cases, good approximations for combinatorial auctions may be unattainable
Approximation algorithms for secondary spectrum auctions
 In Proc. 23rd Symp. Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures (SPAA
, 2011
"... iv ..."
Truthful and NearOptimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
"... We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation.We show that for packing domains, any ffapproximation algorithm that also bounds the integrality gapof the LP relaxation of the problem by ff can be used to construct an ffapproximation mechanismthat is ..."
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Cited by 141 (12 self)
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, we obtain the first truthful mechanisms with approximation guarantees for a variety of multiparameter domains. We obtain truthful (in expectation) mechanisms achieving approximation guarantees of O( p m) for combinatorial auctions (CAs), (1 + ffl) for multiunit CAs with B = \Omega (log m) copies
Results 1  10
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219