Results 1  10
of
112,395
Auctions with Unique Equilibria
, 2013
"... We study BayesNash equilibria in a large class of anonymous orderbased auctions. These include the generalized firstprice auction for allocating positions to bidders, e.g., for sponsored search. We show that when bidders ’ values are independent and identically distributed there is a unique Bayes ..."
Abstract

Cited by 7 (3 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We study BayesNash equilibria in a large class of anonymous orderbased auctions. These include the generalized firstprice auction for allocating positions to bidders, e.g., for sponsored search. We show that when bidders ’ values are independent and identically distributed there is a unique
Spectrum Auctions
, 2001
"... Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries ..."
Abstract

Cited by 450 (20 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Auctions have emerged as the primary means of assigning spectrum licenses to companies wishing to provide wireless communication services. Since July 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has conducted 33 spectrum auctions, assigning thousands of licenses to hundreds of firms. Countries
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS
, 1999
"... This paper provides an elementary, nontechnical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthco ..."
Abstract

Cited by 528 (4 self)
 Add to MetaCart
This paper provides an elementary, nontechnical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub
Worstcase equilibria
 IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM ON THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 1999
"... In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a ver ..."
Abstract

Cited by 851 (17 self)
 Add to MetaCart
In a system in which noncooperative agents share a common resource, we propose the ratio between the worst possible Nash equilibrium and the social optimum as a measure of the effectiveness of the system. Deriving upper and lower bounds for this ratio in a model in which several agents share a very simple network leads to some interesting mathematics, results, and open problems.
Quantal Response Equilibria For Normal Form Games
 NORMAL FORM GAMES, GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
, 1995
"... We investigate the use of standard statistical models for quantal choice in a game theoretic setting. Players choose strategies based on relative expected utility, and assume other players do so as well. We define a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) as a fixed point of this process, and establish e ..."
Abstract

Cited by 634 (27 self)
 Add to MetaCart
existence. For a logit specification of the error structure, we show that as the error goes to zero, QRE approaches a subset of Nash equilibria and also implies a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria in generic games. We fit the model to a variety of experimental data sets by using maximum
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
 AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
, 2007
"... We investigate the “generalized secondprice” (GSP) auction, a new mechanism used by search engines to sell online advertising. Although GSP looks similar to the VickreyClarkeGroves (VCG) mechanism, its properties are very different. Unlike the VCG mechanism, GSP generally does not have an equilib ..."
Abstract

Cited by 547 (20 self)
 Add to MetaCart
an equilibrium in dominant strategies, and truthtelling is not an equilibrium of GSP. To analyze the properties of GSP, we describe the generalized English auction that corresponds to GSP and show that it has a unique equilibrium. This is an ex post equilibrium, with the same payoffs to all players
Computationally Manageable Combinatorial Auctions
, 1998
"... There is interest in designing simultaneous auctions for situations in which the value of assets to a bidder depends upon which other assets he or she wins. In such cases, bidders may well wish to submit bids for combinations of assets. When this is allowed, the problem of determining the revenue ma ..."
Abstract

Cited by 347 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
There is interest in designing simultaneous auctions for situations in which the value of assets to a bidder depends upon which other assets he or she wins. In such cases, bidders may well wish to submit bids for combinations of assets. When this is allowed, the problem of determining the revenue
The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modeling
 Rand Journal of Economics
, 1986
"... This article establishes the relationship between the static axiomatic theory of bargaining and the sequential strategic approach to bargaining. We consider two strategic models of alternating offers. The models differ in the source of the incentive of the bargaining parties to reach agreement: the ..."
Abstract

Cited by 556 (1 self)
 Add to MetaCart
: the bargainers ' time preference and the risk of breakdown of negotiation. Each of the models has a unique perfect equilibrium. When the motivation to reach agreement is made negligible, in each model the unique perfect equilibrium outcome approaches the Nash bargaining solution, with utilities that reflect
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
 Journal of Political Economy
, 2000
"... This article develops a model which shows that bank deposit contracts can provide allocations superior to those of exchange markets, offering an explanation of how banks subject to runs can attract deposits. Investors face privately observed risks which lead to a demand for liquidity. Traditional ..."
Abstract

Cited by 1178 (13 self)
 Add to MetaCart
. Traditional demand deposit contracts which provide liquidity have multiple equilibria, one of which is a bank run. Bank runs in the model cause real economic damage, rather than simply reflecting other problems. Contracts which can prevent runs are studied, and the analysis shows
On the Private Provision of Public Goods
 Journal of Public Economics
, 1986
"... We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. Howe ..."
Abstract

Cited by 546 (8 self)
 Add to MetaCart
We consider a general model of the noncooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good
Results 1  10
of
112,395