-58113-634-X/03/06 ...$5.00. We describe LockX, a system for specifying and efficiently querying secure XML documents. LockX is based on a simple, yet useful, security model that uses a multi-level access control specification. The DTD identifies which elements must, may, or cannot specify their security

query language. We show that our query language is a natural fit for routing, and can express a variety of well-known routing protocols in a compact and clean fashion. We discuss the security of our proposal in terms of its computational expressive power and language design. Via simulation

in the face of these attacks for applications backed by SQL databases. It works by executing SQL queries over encrypted data using a collection of efficient SQL-aware encryption schemes. CryptDB can also chain encryption keys to user passwords, so that a data item can be decrypted only by using the password

you quite quickly what to choose. However, you cannot use the same simple emotional judgment when you are in the shoes of an economist trying to optimize the access to the locks on the Mississippi River. The task is to find a pricing structure that assures the most efficient and uninterrupted use

Abstract. We present an Identity Based Encryption (IBE) system that is fully secure in the standard model and has several advantages over previous such systems – namely, computational efficiency, shorter public parameters, and a “tight ” security reduction, albeit to a stronger assumption

to achieve this efficiency. We have tested our system on all 22 SQL queries of the TPC-H database benchmark which we represented in XSLT and then translated back to SQL using our translator.

provenance efficiently. The ExSPAN prototype is developed using Rapid-Net, a declarative networking platform based on the emerging ns-3 toolkit. Experiments over a simulated network and an actual deployment in a testbed environment demonstrate that our system supports a wide range of distributed provenance

Motivated by the ”database-as-service ” paradigm wherein data owned by a client is hosted on a third-party server, there is significant interest in secure query evaluation over encrypted databases. We consider this problem for XML databases. We consider an attack model where the attacker may

, and sketch how a practi-cal system meeting the definition could be built and proven secure. The primary goal of this paper is to provide a vision of how research in this area should proceed: efficient encrypted database and query processing with provable security properties. 1

I am grateful to Luc Segoufin who kindly accepted me to be his PhD student. He introduced me to the problem of query enumeration and encouraged me to look for the answers to all the questions that emerged during our collaboration. He was a truly great advisor, always supportive and available