Searching for "Incentive-Compatible Social Choice." – sorted by Relevance.
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STRATEGIC DISTINGUISHABILITY AND ROBUST VIRTUAL IMPLEMENTATION By
- are treated the same by the social choice function. We show that ex post incentive compatibility and robust
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Strategic distinguishability with an application to Robust Virtual Implementation
- implementation will be ex post incentive compatibility: under the social choice function, each agent must have
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ROBUST IMPLEMENTATION IN DIRECT MECHANISMS By
- the truth). Thus the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints characterize whether a social choice
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Mechanism Theory
- ) if the social choice function f =(d, t0 ) is dominant strategy incentive compatible, where t0 is the transfer
- Cited by 23 (0 self) – Add To MetaCart
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Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms
- conditions for robust implementation are ex post incentive compatibility of the social choice function and a
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The Effect of False-name Declarations in Mechanism Design: New Fraud in Internet Auctions
- . Definition 2.7. The social choice function f is dominant strategy incentive compatible (or truthfully
- Cited by 12 (9 self) – Add To MetaCart
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Robust Implementation: The Role of Large Type Spaces
- the Bayesian incentive compatibility constraints characterize whether a social choice function is implementable
- Cited by 5 (3 self) – Add To MetaCart
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Overcoming incentive constraints by linking decisions, Econometrica
- is that this social choice function viewed is not incentive compatible. For instance, either agent would be better off
- Cited by 5 (0 self) – Add To MetaCart
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Overcoming Incentive Constraints
- value-1 coin coin a a 2 coin coin a a This social choice function is the unique incentive compatible one
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www.elsevier.com/locate/geb Ex post implementation ✩
- exclusively on the incentive compatibility of the social choice problem in the direct mechanism. In contrast
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