Searching for authors named "Carmine Ventre" – sorted by Relevance.
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Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain
- In this paper we generalize the concept of verification introduced by Nisan and Ronen [STOC 1999]. We assume to have selfish agents with general valuation functions and we study mechanisms with verification for optimization problems with these selfish agents. We provide a technique for designing tru
- Cited by 2 (0 self) – Add To MetaCart
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Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification
- We study the so called mechanisms with verification introduced by Nisan and Ronen [1999]. We show that these mechanisms can optimize any “reasonable ” cost function and that they can be resistant to any coalition of colluding agents in the strongest model which allows agents to exchange side payment
- Cited by 1 (0 self) – Add To MetaCart
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The algorithmic structure of group strategyproof budgetbalanced cost-sharing mechanisms
- We show that mechanisms satisfying all these requirements must obey certain algorithmic properties (which basically specify how the serviced users are selected). Our results yield a characterization of upper continuous mechanisms (this class is interesting as all known general techniques yield mecha
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Energy-Efficient Broadcasting in Ad-Hoc Networks: Combining MSTs with Shortest-Path Trees
- We investigate the problem of constructing a multicast tree in ad-hoc networks. In particular, we address the issue of the power consumption, that is, the overall energy that the stations must spend to implement such a tree. We focus on two extreme cases of multicast: broadcast (one-to-all) and unic
- Cited by 5 (1 self) – Add To MetaCart
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Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions in Wireless Networks
- We investigate the problem of sharing the cost of a multicast transmission in a wireless network where each node (radio station) of the network corresponds to a (set of) user(s) potentially interested in receiving the transmission. As in the model considered by Feigenbaum et al [2001], users may
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Improvements for truthful mechanisms with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents
- In this paper we study optimization problems with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents introduced by Auletta et al. [ICALP 2004]. Our goal is to allocate load among the agents, provided that the secret data of each agent is a single positive rational number: the cost they incur per unit load. In
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Motivating Verification Model........................ 20
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New Constructions of Mechanisms with Veri cation
- A social choice function A is implementable with veri cation if there exists a payment scheme P such that (A, P) is a truthful mechanism for veri able agents [Nisan and Ronen STOC 99]. In this paper we address the following questions. Given an objective function µ, does there exist a social choice f
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