We describe an efficient mix-net. Its efficiency is based on a novel method, double...

. (2002). Then we provide the first definition of security of a mix-net in the universally composable security framework (UC-framework) introduced by Canetti (2001). We construct two distinct efficient mix-nets that are provably secure under standard assumptions in the UC-framework against an adversary

Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels [10] recently presented a very efficient mix-net, that they claim to be both robust, and secure. We present four practical attacks for their mix-net, and break both its privacy and robustness. Each attack exploits and illustrates a separate weakness

Abstract. We describe a design for a reputation system that increases the reliability and thus efficiency of remailer services. Our reputation system uses a MIX-net in which MIXes give receipts for intermediate messages. Together with a set of witnesses, these receipts allow senders to verify

The Jakobsson hybrid Mix-net proposed by Jakobsson and Juels, is a very practical and efficient scheme for long input messages. But this hybrid Mix-net does not have public verifiable property. In this paper a new attack to the Jakobsson hybrid Mix-net is introduced. This attack breaks

efficient mix-net. We identify serious issues in the original description of mix-nets with RPC and show how to exploit these to break both correctness and privacy, both for Chaumian and homomorphic mix-nets. Our attacks are practical and applicable to real world mix-net implementations, e.g., the Civitas

The VALG project is introducing e-voting to municipal and county elections to Norway. Part of the e-voting system is a mix-net along the lines of Puiggalí et al.- a mix-net which can be efficiently verified by combining the benefits of optimistic mixing and randomized partial checking. This paper

We introduce the first El Gamal based mix-net in which each mix-server partially decrypts and permutes its input, i.e., no reencryption is necessary. An interesting property of the construction is that a sender can verify non-interactively that its message is processed correctly. We call

between discrete variables and continuous variables without requiring discretization of the continuous variables. We present efficient heuristic algorithms for automatically learning these networks from data, and perform comparative experiments illustrating how well these networks model real scientific

Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, and Juels [10] recently presented a very efficient mix-net, that they claim to be both robust, and secure. We present four practical attacks for their mix-net, and break both its privacy and robustness. Each attack exploits and illustrates a separate weakness