When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Coordina-tion frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to and …rms do not know which workers are considered by other …rms. We show that these coordination frictions and the wage mechanism are not independent. Only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post competition generate the maximum matching on any realized network. E ¢ cient network formation requires that identical …rms face the same arrival rate of applicants. If …rms make o¤ers to workers, the resulting equilibrium is socially ine ¢ cient in terms of vacancy creation, worker participation and search intensity. However, if workers would make o¤ers to …rms, e ¢ ciency is obtained in all dimensions.

Nardi, Juha Seppala and Christopher Sleet for excellent research assistance. The views expressed here are ours and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve System. Sargent's research

. _________________________ 1818 H Street N.W., Washington, DC, 20433 (ddollar@worldbank.org, akraay@worldbank.org). We are grateful to Dennis Tao for excellent research assistance. This paper and the accompanying dataset are available at www.worldbank.org/research/gro...

We are grateful to Yongsung Chang and three referees, particularly the final referee, for useful comments. Saasha Celestial-One provided excellent research assistance. Does Schooling Cause Growth? Barro (1991) and others find that growth and schooling are highly correlated across countries. A model

the Spanish translation, and to Patrick Wang, Beth Welty and Lorin Obler for excellent research assistance. We thank all of the members of the MTO teams at MBHP, BHA, Abt and Westat for making our research possible, and Carol Luttrell for facilitating our access to administrative data. We have benefitted from

Maloney provided excellent assistance, and Mary Balderstone of the

been submitted for apprbva1 by the Board of Directors. *This research was supported by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Thanks are due to Sean Becketti for excellent research assistance and to Lung Fei Lee for advice on statistical issues. The order of the authors ' names was selected

for helpful suggestions. Jennifer Ferng provided excellent assistance in compiling the data. Financial

Three hypotheses about the nature of federal tax arrears in Russia in the second half of the ’90s are tested empirically. Tax arrears can be a result of: 1) liquidity problems in firms, 2) federal implicit subsidies, or 3) regional political resistance to federal tax collectors. Liquidity problems do not explain federal tax arrears: higher arrears were found in more liquid and more productive firms. For a given level of liquidity and size, firms had higher tax arrears in regions with better bargaining position vis-à-vis center, i.e. better political strength (measured by higher popularity of governors, worse relationships with center, higher regional share in total tax collections and lower transfers) and higher economic strength (measured by higher expenditure provision and per capita gross regional product). In addition, excessive employment earned firms higher tax arrears. The results are consistent with active regional resistance and explain why federal tax arrears accumulated faster than regional arrears. Журавская Е.В., Пономарева М.В. Неплатежи в федеральный бюджет: проблема ликвидности, федеральные субсидии или защита регионов от федеральных налоговых

Rodney Cruz for careful collection of data and to Geoffrey Wallace and Lucie Schmidt for excellent